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Most empirical studies have estimated a positive union-nonunion “injury gap,” suggesting that 
unionized workers are more likely to have a nonfatal occupational injury than their nonunion 
counterparts. Using individual-level panel data for the first time, I study several explanations for 
this puzzling result. I find that controlling for time-invariant individual fixed effects already re-
duces the gap by around 40%. Some of the explanations that I study contribute in reducing this gap 
even further. I, however, do not find evidence of the gap becoming negative and the impact of 
unions on nonfatal injuries appears to be insignificant at best. 
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“There remain two puzzling results of the estimation of our model of coal mining injuries. The first of 
these is the fact that unionized mines have higher non-fatal accident rates than would be expected for 
non-union mines with the same characteristics. [...]” (Boden 1977: 139) 
“The absence of any evidence of a significant union reduction of hazards runs counter to the conclu-
sion one might draw on the basis of one’s observation of actual union actions.” (Viscusi 1979a: 231) 
Most empirical studies suggest that unionized workers are more likely to have a nonfatal 
occupational injury than their nonunion counterparts. This result has puzzled researchers for more 
than three decades (as the quotes above illustrate
2
) since it clearly contradicts expectations based 
on anecdotal evidence and on unions’ activities. This paper has two main goals: to provide new 
estimates of this impact using individual-level panel data for the first time, and to try to explain 
why unionized workers are more likely to have a nonfatal occupational injury. 
On the first goal, my benchmark estimates using individual-level panel data suggest that 
union members are at least 34% more likely to have a nonfatal occupational injury than their 
nonunion counterparts. Moreover, for injuries with several days of incapacity, the injury gap 
between union and nonunion members seems to be considerably higher than 34%. I complement 
these results by presenting a summary of the empirical literature studying the impact of unions on 
occupational injuries. I find that unions are associated with more nonfatal occupational injuries in 
27 of the 32 estimates that I consider in my summary. More surprisingly, of the five estimates that 
associate unions with less nonfatal occupational injuries, only one single estimate is statistically 
significant. 
These empirical results are in stark contrast with the anecdotal evidence that attributes 
labor unions an influential role in improving occupational health and safety. Some authors have for 
example stressed the importance of unions in the development and passage of government legis-
lation such as the Occupational Safety and Health Act in 1970 (Schurman et al. 1998: 134-6). 
Other prominent examples of unions’ safety-enhancing activities include gaining recognition for 
occupational diseases caused by exposure to coal dust (Smith 1987), cotton dust (Botsch 1993), 
asbestos (Rosner and Markovitz 1991), radium (Clark 1997), and dibromochloropropane (Rob-
inson 1991). 
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In more general terms, labor unions are believed to influence occupational health and 
safety outcomes in several important ways. These include the provision of job hazard information, 
the protection of workers who refuse to accept hazardous assignments, and the assistance and 
representation of workers in accident compensation claims. Moreover, apart from influencing the 
regulatory process and its enforcement, unions bargain for the provision of protective equipment, 
for compensatory wages, and for the establishment of joint union-management health and safety 
committees.
3
 
What could explain such a dramatic divergence between the anecdotal and the empirical 
evidence? Trying to provide an answer to this question is the second goal of this paper. I first 
explore the three explanations with the most consensus in the literature, which I label as “report-
ing”, “selection”, and “wages for safety.” First, according to the reporting explanation, unions are 
believed to reduce the number of actual nonfatal injuries but also to increase the number of injuries 
that are reported. Since most data sources are not based on actual but on reported injuries, unions 
appear to be associated with more injuries in most of the cases. Second, proponents of the selec-
tion explanation argue that the positive association between unions and more nonfatal injuries is 
because unions are more likely to organize hazardous workplaces and not because unions are 
causing more injuries. Third, the wages-for-safety explanation suggests that unionized workers 
simply prefer higher wages than safer workplaces. Accordingly, unions campaign for higher 
wages but management reacts to this by reducing investment in occupational health and safety. As 
a result, unionized workers are paid higher wages at the expense of having more injuries. 
Finally, I study two new explanations that have never been connected to labor unions be-
fore. The first one is called moral hazard and comes from the theoretical literature on occupa-
tional health and safety (Viscusi 1979b; Rea 1981; Carmichael 1986; and Lanoie 1991). The 
argument is that workers themselves might offset the benefits of a safer work environment by 
diminishing their own safety-enhancing efforts. Supported by the anecdotal evidence, I extend this 
explanation by arguing that it is labor unions that in many cases provide or bargain for the safer 
work environment. The increased safety and protection that unions provide enhance workers’ 
feeling of safety, leading workers to adapt their behavior, for example, by working faster, be-
coming bolder, or by taking less safety precautions. This riskier behavior might then partially 
                                                 
3
See Robinson (1991: 40); Beaumont (1983: 2); Viscusi (1979a: 230-1); Dorman (1996: 131-4); and Schurman et al. 
(1998). 
4 
 
offset the union safety efforts. 
The second new explanation is called distribution shifting. In fact, according to my lit-
erature summary, most empirical studies associate unions with more nonfatal injuries but also with 
less fatalities. The explanation then is that the introduction of union-sponsored safety measures in 
a workplace might “convert” fatal injuries into nonfatal injuries. In the statistics, this will show up 
as an increase in nonfatal injuries but as a decrease in fatalities. 
I explore all these five explanations mainly using panel data from the National Longitu-
dinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79). Overall, I find little evidence for the wages-for-safety 
explanation, but it seems that each of the other explanations might explain part of the nonfatal 
injury gap. Moreover, my panel estimates show that simply controlling for time-invariant indi-
vidual fixed effects already reduces the nonfatal injury gap by around 40%. 
 
Evidence from the empirical literature 
 
This section surveys the empirical literature investigating the impact of labor unions on 
occupational injuries. This literature usually estimates an equation of the form 
 
 , = uUNIONINJURY
'  γX  (1) 
 
where INJURY is some measure of the number or frequency of occupational injuries, UNION is a 
variable indicating union status, X  is a vector of control variables, and u  is the error term. The 
impact of unionism on occupational injuries is thus given by the estimate of  . Based on the 
anecdotal evidence and on the unions’ activities briefly summarized in the introduction, one 
should expect unions to have a significant impact in reducing injuries, that is, the   coefficient is 
expected to be negative and significant. 
Table 1 summarizes 25 studies estimating some variation of (1). As can be seen from the 
table, there is a remarkable heterogeneity between these studies, encompassing different countries, 
industries, years considered, data types, cross-sectional units, number of observations, and 
measures of the UNION and INJURY variables. The most important result for the purposes of this 
section is given in column 9. This column summarizes the type of INJURY variable used in each 
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study and, in parenthesis, the sign and significance of the   coefficients, that is, the impact that 
the UNION variable had on the INJURY variable. Only the estimates that used a measure of fatal 
(FAT) or nonfatal injuries (NFI) for the INJURY variable were included in the table.
4
 Note that 
some authors reported multiple estimates of  . This is typically done to experiment with different 
regression specifications, for sensitivity analysis, or when different dependent variables or data 
sets are employed. For each different INJURY variable, I chose the estimates that the author 
seemed to judge as the best, giving a total sample of 43 observations. Some key proportions of the 
final sample are summarized in the top panel of Table 2. 
 
{{Place Table 1 about here}} 
 
{{Place Table 2 about here}} 
 
The bottom panel of Table 2 summarizes the number of estimates by type of injury. When 
considering all injury types, 5 estimates of   were negative and significant (at the 5% level), 22 
were insignificant, and 16 were positive and significant. What can we conclude from this? Since, 
based on the anecdotal evidence and unions’ activities, we were expecting   to be negative and 
significant, the results are clearly puzzling. Only in 5 of the 43 estimates, labor unions were sig-
nificantly associated with fewer injuries. 
A very interesting pattern, however, emerges if fatal and nonfatal injuries are considered 
separately. As the bottom panel of Table 2 (last two rows) shows, labor unions are in most cases 
associated with fewer fatalities but with more nonfatal injuries. In fact, labor unions are associated 
with more nonfatal injuries in 84% of the estimates and of these 60% are statistically significant. 
Even more surprising is the fact that the negative and significant association between unions and 
nonfatal injuries that we were expecting was found in only one single study! Moreover, as Table 1 
indicates, the paradoxical positive association appears to be robust across countries, industries, 
years considered, data types, cross-sectional units, and measures of the union variable. 
The most important conclusion that I draw from the existing empirical literature is, 
therefore, that the impact of unions on injuries appears to be different depending on the type of 
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injury studied. While the association between unions and nonfatal injuries is in most cases posi-
tive, the association between unions and fatal injuries seems to be negative. My expectations 
regarding the impact of unions on injuries are only (partially) confirmed for fatal injuries. For 
nonfatal injuries, the empirical literature clearly contradicts most expectations based on anecdotal 
evidence. 
 
New evidence from individual-level panel data 
 
This section extends the empirical literature by providing estimates of the injury-union 
equation (1) using panel data at the individual level for the first time. The data come from the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79). This survey was administered for the 
first time in 1979, interviewing a sample of 12,686 American young men and women aged be-
tween 14 and 22 years. Until 1994, the cohort was interviewed every year. Since then, the survey 
has been conducted on a biennially basis. For this paper, the analysis has been restricted to the 
years for which information was available for all relevant INJURY and UNION variables. These 
years are 1988, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000, corresponding to the period 
in which the respondents were aged between 23 and 44 years. 
The major advantage of this survey is that it provides detailed data on occupational inju-
ries, on union status, and on an extensive set of questions on personal and job characteristics. The 
richness of the NLSY79 data makes possible to study the union impact on injuries at a depth that 
has not been possible before using other data sets. There are at least three reasons for this. First, as 
Table 1 shows, all previous estimations at the individual level were based on cross-sectional data. 
This type of data has several limitations. In particular, it only allows to make comparisons across 
individuals, and it is not possible to follow the same person over time. Second, in none of the data 
sets used before there was information on both INJURY and UNION variables. Researchers were 
obliged to match injury rates at the industry level from another data source to each individual for 
which they had information on their union status and other characteristics. The NLSY79, however, 
allows to calculate the probability of having an injury based on each individual’s own experience 
and not on an average of the industry where they work. Third, the NLSY79 data set is the only one 
that has information on both union membership and on union coverage. This gives us two possi-
bilities for measuring the UNION variable. 
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Definitions and sample means for the INJURY, UNION, and other variables used to esti-
mate the injury-union equation (1) are reported in Table 3. The INJURY variable is called NFI and 
is based on the following question: “Since [date of last interview], have you had an incident at any 
job we previously discussed that resulted in an injury or illness to you?” Aside from the year 1991, 
this question was asked on every NLSY79 interview between 1988 and 2000. It is important to 
mention that the INJURY variable is defined for injuries of all severity degrees, that is, it comprises 
injuries that led to no time off as well as injuries that led to one or more days of incapacity. As 
Table 3, column 1 shows, in 6.2% of the cases, respondents reported having had a nonfatal 
work-related injury or illness between 1988 and 2000. The variables used to measure union status 
are union membership (MEMBERSHIP) and union coverage (COVERAGE). In general, not all 
workers covered by a union contract are members of a union. In fact, as Table 3, column 1 illus-
trates, in 18.7% of the cases, respondents reported being covered by a union contract while only in 
14.2% of the cases, they reported being member of a labor union. 
 
{{Place Table 3 about here}} 
 
Table 3 also reports the sample means by dividing the sample into union and nonunion 
members (columns 2 and 3). Probably the most relevant comparison here is that, on average, union 
members are much more likely to report having had an injury than nonunion members (10.5% vs. 
5.5%). As column 4 shows, this difference is significant at the 1% level. Obviously, this com-
parison is only suggestive, since it does not control for other potential differences between union 
and nonunion members. As columns 2 and 3 also reveal, there are indeed other important differ-
ences between the two groups, and almost all differences are statistically significant. For example, 
union members are on average less satisfied with their jobs, have a longer job tenure, work more 
hours per week, work in bigger firms, are more likely to be male, black, or Hispanic, and earn 
higher wages. Only in terms of health status (HEALTH), there appears to be no significant dif-
ference between union and nonunion members. 
Table 4a reports the coefficient estimates from equation (1). As a benchmark against which 
to compare the fixed-effects estimates, columns 1 and 2 first report pooled OLS regressions. 
Columns 3 and 4 show the fixed effects estimates that exploit the panel nature of the data. Both 
models are estimated using the two different union status measures (COVERAGE and MEM-
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BERSHIP) and always with nonfatal injuries (NFI) as the outcome variable. The estimated re-
gressions include an extensive list of control variables containing measurements of the individu-
als’ health, job satisfaction, tenure with employer and its square, firm size, hours per week worked, 
years of education, number of children, age, marital status, type of residence, and dummies for 8 
years, 3 regions, 11 industries, and 11 occupations, for a total of 44 control variables. The OLS 
model also includes dummies for male, black and Hispanic
5
 (see Tables 3 and 9 for complete 
definitions and summary statistics). Only the estimates based on linear probability models are 
reported in this paper. Other models, like the logit, yield very similar results.
6
 
 
{{Place Table 4a about here}} 
 
Table 4a gives a very clear picture of the impact of labor unions on nonfatal occupational 
injuries. Irrespective of the model or the UNION measure used, unions are clearly associated with 
more nonfatal injuries, after controlling for the extensive set of personal and job characteristics. 
The UNION coefficient is positive and highly significant in all estimations, confirming and rein-
forcing the pattern from the empirical literature summarized in the previous section. Also note that 
the estimates of the control variables are in accordance to expectations. 
Turning to the interpretation of the UNION estimates, according to the OLS model, the 
probability of having an occupational injury is .0271 higher for covered workers and .0326 higher 
for union members. These values are not small. In fact, one way to put these values into perspec-
tive is by comparing them with the “nonunion baseline” values also reported at the bottom of Table 
4a. The nonunion baseline is the average predicted injury probability of the nonunion workers. 
Adding the UNION estimates to the nonunion baseline values gives the average predicted injury 
probability of the union workers, which are .0563+.0271=8.34% for covered workers and 
.0567+.0326=8.93% for union members. The table also reports the “injury gap,” which is the 
percentage increase in the injury probability for union compared to nonunion workers. The injury 
gap thus indicates that the probability of having an occupational injury increases by 48% for 
workers that change their union status from not covered to covered and by 57% if they change 
from nonmember to member. 
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The gender and race dummies are not included in the fixed effects model as this model is not able to estimate the 
coefficient of time-invariant regressors. 
6
A Hausman test clearly rejects the random-effects model. 
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The fixed effects UNION estimates in columns 3 and 4 are much lower than the OLS es-
timates. The resulting injury gaps are reduced from 48% to 27% for covered workers and from 
57% to 34% for union members. One important advantage of the fixed effects model is that it 
allows to control for the unobserved time-constant factors that affect INJURY. Even if the results 
from the two models are qualitatively similar, the OLS model clearly overestimates the UNION 
coefficient. 
Table 4b reports estimates of the UNION coefficient similar to those of Table 4a but for the 
subsamples of males, females, blue collars and white collars
7
. The numbers in parenthesis and in 
square brackets are respectively the panel robust standard errors and the number of observations. 
All regressions include the full set of control variables. As in the previous table, the OLS model 
always overestimates the UNION coefficient, pointing to the importance of including individual 
fixed effects. Also, the UNION coefficient for the female subsample becomes insignificant at the 
conventional 5% level when moving from the OLS to the FE model. This is a result that I will 
explore more in depth in a section below. Moreover, the significance of the UNION coefficient for 
the blue-collars subsample is also reduced when using the MEMBERSHIP measure.
8
 
 
{{Place Table 4b about here}} 
 
Finally, note that the magnitude of my estimated union coefficients are difficult to compare 
to those from the literature. The reason is that previous studies have investigated the impact of 
unions on injuries at different aggregation levels (see Table 1, column 6), and only 5 studies have 
employed individual-level data. However, although in these 5 papers the union and the other 
regressors are measured at the individual level, the injury (dependent) variable is typically an 
injury rate, measured at the industry level. In other words, these 5 papers estimate the impact that a 
particular person is unionized on the industry-level injury rate. In contrast to this, the results that I 
report in this paper are based on each individual’s own experience and not on an average of the 
industry where they work. For this reason, the NLSY79 allows me to directly compute the un-
ion-nonunion injury gap for the first time in the literature. 
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See Table 9 for the exact definition of “blue collar.” 
8
In what follows, I will not report the estimates based on the COVERAGE variable. These estimates are qualitatively 
the same to those using the MEMBERSHIP variable but the resulting injury gap is always smaller. 
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Traditional explanations 
 
The results from the previous two sections provide clear evidence of a positive association 
between labor unions and nonfatal injuries. In this section, we will try to understand why. As the 
last column in Table 1 shows, the literature has suggested several explanations for this paradoxical 
result. There are, in particular, three explanations that appear to be gaining some consensus among 
researchers. From the 25 studies summarized in Table 1, “reporting” was mentioned in 12 studies, 
“selection” in 6 studies, and “wages for safety” in 4 studies. This section will explore these three 
explanations in turn. 
 
Reporting 
 
The explanation most often mentioned in the literature is reporting. According to this ex-
planation, unions are believed to reduce the number of actual injuries but also to increase the 
number of injuries that are reported. Since most data sources are not based on actual but on re-
ported injuries, unions appear to be associated with more injuries in most of the cases. 
There are at least two reasons why unions might increase the number of reported injuries. 
First, at the establishment level, unions might better monitor the reporting of injuries by employ-
ers. In fact, firms have an incentive to underreport injuries for different cost-saving reasons, for 
example, to reduce paperwork, to maintain lower insurance premia in the workers’ compensation 
system, or to avoid triggering safety inspections from governmental authorities (Leigh et al. 2004: 
11). Second, at the individual level, unionized workers might simply report more injuries because 
they might be less fearful of management retaliation. For instance, “[w]orkers who report health 
problems to supervisors may risk disciplinary action, denial of overtime or promotion opportuni-
ties, stigmatization, drug testing, harassment, or job loss” (Azaroff et al. 2002: 1422). Union 
members are often better protected against these types of retaliation. 
Are the estimates based on the NLSY79 data set affected by less underreporting in un-
ionized workplaces? I argue here that this does not seem to be the case. By construction, this data 
set is very different to all previous data sets that have been used in the literature to estimate the 
11 
 
injury-union regression (1).
9
 The NLSY79 data set is not based on information provided by firms, 
which have an incentive to underreport injuries, but by individuals during a private interview. 
Many different questions are asked to these individuals, which range from school attendance to 
family composition, and there is no apparent reason for them to give inaccurate information on 
potential occupational injuries. I use this different data construction as an argument against the 
“reporting” explanation and claim that the estimates in Table 4a do not appear to be affected by 
underreporting. 
There is however one problem with this interpretation of the results. It is often the case that 
workers do not perceive some of the hazard risks in their workplace and better-informed unionized 
workers might be more likely to report an injury to the NLSY79 interviewers, simply because they 
are more aware of safety issues and not because they are having more injuries. In fact, some oc-
cupational injuries or illnesses take some time to manifest, and workers are not always sure if their 
workplace was at the origin of the injury or illness. One of the unions’ safety activities is to provide 
workers with job hazard information (Donado and Wälde 2012). In that sense, if a unionized 
worker is more likely to report an occupational injury to the NLSY79 interviewers, the estimates 
of the injury gap in Table 4a would be biased upwards. Notice that this “information advantage” of 
union members is different to the “reporting” explanation from the literature. The literature uses 
reporting to explain that actual injuries, of which workers and management are aware, are not 
being reported because firms have cost-saving incentives to underreport them. 
In any case, one possibility to assess if the results in Table 4a are biased upwards because 
of union workers’ information advantage is to estimate the injury-union regression (1) for more 
severe injuries. In fact, it seems reasonable to assume that the unionized workers’ knowledge 
advantage is lower, the more severe an injury is. More visible or severe injuries are more likely to 
be recognized by a worker that is not unionized. The information advantage bias should narrow, 
the more severe an injury is. Fortunately, the NLSY79 also asks respondents to indicate the 
number of work days missed due to the occupational injury. This variable, which I am calling 
SEVERITY (see Table 3 for definition and summary statistics), can be used to estimate the injury 
gap for different severity degrees. 
Figure 1 plots the injury gaps that resulted from estimating regression (1) for increasing 
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The only exception is one of the two estimates with nonfatal injuries as the outcome variable from Worral and Butler 
(1983). They use for this a measure of actual, not reported, injuries. 
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injury severity degrees. For at least zero days of incapacity, we obtain the injury gap of 34% that 
was already reported in column 4 of Table 4a. Moving to the right in the figure gives injury gaps 
corresponding to more and more severe injuries. For example, for at least 5 days of incapacity, the 
injury gap increases to 70%. For at least 60 days of incapacity, the injury gap is 47%. If the esti-
mates were biased upwards due to an information advantage bias, we would expect a graphic with 
a falling trend. The graphic however exhibits no discernible trend, and the estimates do not appear 
to be biased, at least for the range of severity considered.
10
 Restricting the sample to males, fe-
males, blue collars, or white collars leads to the same conclusion. 
 
{{Place Figure 1 about here}} 
 
Some caution should however be exercised with this SEVERITY variable since the number 
of work days missed due to the injury might not provide a perfect measure of severity. If a union 
worker is able to take more time off than a nonunion worker for the same type of injury, then the 
injuries for union workers will appear to be more severe. Restricting the sample to more severe 
injuries will still overestimate the “true” injury gap. 
In conclusion, although the results presented in this section do not appear to support the 
reporting explanation, it is however not possible to rule out that reporting bias might still be an 
issue in other data sets and might explain part of the injury gap found in previous studies. 
 
Selection 
 
As the literature summary in Table 1 shows, the second most important explanation after 
reporting (REP) is selection (SEL). The selection explanation can be given two interpretations. 
The first interpretation is that the UNION variable might also be capturing the impact of workplace 
risk, suggesting that the UNION estimates are positive because union workplaces are riskier and 
not because unions are causing more injuries. The second interpretation is that the causality of 
UNION and INJURY might run in both directions. Unions might cause more injuries, but more 
injuries (or more hazardous workplaces) might also cause workers to form or join unions. Failing 
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The SEVERITY variable does include information on injuries resulting in more than 90 days of incapacity. Since 
these types of injuries do not occur very often, the sample is very small and the estimates based on them are very 
imprecise. 
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to take into account this double causality might produce estimates that lead to the wrong conclu-
sions. This section employs two different strategies to test each of these interpretations. The first 
strategy is to control for workplace risk. The second is to use instrumental variable methods to try 
to isolate the causal impact of unions on injuries. 
 
Controlling for workplace risk 
 
If the UNION variable is also capturing workplace risk, then the natural extension of the 
injury-union regression (1) is to include a new control variable that accounts for the average risk of 
the workplace where the worker is employed. In that way, the UNION coefficient can be “cleaned” 
from this influence. 
Table 5 reports the estimates of the injury-union regression (1) that also control for 
workplace risk. In columns 2 and 3, the workplace risk variables are two questions from the 
NLSY79 that ask respondents to rate, on a scale of one to four, how dangerous (DANGEROUS88) 
and how unhealthy (UNHEALTHY88) their job were (see Table 3 for definitions and summary 
statistics). As shown by the sample means from Table 3 (columns 2 and 3), unionized workers rate 
on average their jobs as being more dangerous and unhealthier, pointing to the need for also in-
cluding these variables in the regression. Unfortunately, these questions were only asked in 1988, 
and the estimates reported in columns 2 and 3 from Table 5 are OLS for this year only. Column 1 
reports, as a benchmark, the same model as in columns 2 and 3 but without controlling for work-
place risk. 
 
{{Place Table 5 about here}} 
 
Comparing the estimates from the benchmark model in column 1 with those of columns 2 
and 3 shows that including the workplace risk variables clearly reduces the size of the UNION 
coefficient and it also reduces somewhat its significance. This suggests that the UNION variable 
might indeed be capturing some of the workplace risk. The two workplace risk variables are highly 
significant. 
Now, in order to be able to exploit the panel nature of the NLSY79 data set by controlling 
for changes in workplace risk over time, I used a variable from a different data set that was 
14 
 
available for all the years of the NLSY79 sample. The data for this new variable are based on the 
incidence rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Survey of Occupational Injuries and 
Illnesses. The incidence rates are defined as the number of nonfatal occupational injury and illness 
cases per 100 full-time workers. These incidence rates are available for more than 200 industries 
for every year and represent a very good proxy of the average risk in each industry. These rates 
were transformed by multiplying them by 100 and by taking the log in order to obtain the final 
INDUSTRYRISK variable (see Table 3 for definition and summary statistics). Since the NLSY79 
respondents also report the detailed industry where they work, it is possible to match the (trans-
formed) BLS incidence rates with the NLSY79 respondents based on the industry codes provided 
in both data sets.
11
 
The UNION fixed-effects estimates that also control for the INDUSTRYRISK variable are 
reported in Table 5, column 4. These estimates can be compared to those of Table 4a, column 4, 
showing that in this case the inclusion of the INDUSTRYRISK variable barely affects the UNION 
estimates. The INDUSTRYRISK variable turns out to be significant only at the 10% level. 
One concern that might be raised regarding the results reported in column 4 is that the 
standard errors might be downward biased. The reason is that the INDUSTRYRISK variable is 
measured at the industry level, while all other variables are measured at the individual level. As-
signing the same risk rate to workers within the same industry introduces correlation of the re-
gression error terms for individuals in a given industry. Standard errors not corrected for this 
correlation might be underestimated. This problem is called the Moulton problem (Moulton 1986). 
In order to account for this, the model in column 5 clusters the standard errors not only at the 
individual but also at the industry level following the two-way clustering strategy proposed by 
Cameron et al. (2011). The results in column 5 show that clustering also at the industry level 
indeed increases somewhat the standard errors of the UNION and the INDUSTRYRISK variables. 
Even though the UNION variable remains highly significant, the INDUSTRYRISK variable is now 
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The BLS data can be downloaded at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/time.series/sh/ and at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/time.series/hs/. 
Each NLSY79 respondent was matched to the (transformed) BLS incidence rates based on the respondents’ reported 
industry code at the most precise level of industry breakdown that the two data sets allowed to. In many cases, this was 
at the three-digit level. Due to data limitations, however, it was not possible to assign every NLSY79 respondent to a 
particular industry-risk group. For example, the BLS survey does not provide incidence rates for the public admin-
istration sector. Despite these limitations, it was possible to construct more than 200 industry-risk groups for every 
year. The BLS data are based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) System from 1972 and 1987, while the 
NLSY79 respondents are coded using the 1970 and the 1980 industry classification system of the Census of Popula-
tion. The two data sets were merged using concordance tables that relate both classification systems to each other. 
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significant only at the 10.65% level. It is however interesting to note that excluding the industry 
dummies (see column 6) renders the INDUSTRYRISK variable highly significant. This suggests 
that the industry dummies were already capturing the over-time variation in workplace risk, 
without affecting the UNION coefficient by much. 
To summarize this section, the results presented in Table 5 suggest that the UNION vari-
able might indeed be capturing some of the workplace risk. The OLS estimates even indicate a 
reduction of around 45% in the injury gap. However, since including the workplace risk regressors 
still gives positive and significant UNION estimates, I conclude that there is more needed than this 
explanation alone to account for the full injury gap. 
 
IV estimates 
 
According to one of the definitions of endogeneity, the UNION variable is endogenous if it 
is correlated with the error term u  in equation (1). This error term can be viewed as having two 
components, one time-variant t  and one time-invariant  , so that ttu  = , where t  in-
dexes time. The fixed-effects estimation approach that I used to estimate (1) already controls for 
union endogeneity if UNION is correlated only with the time-invariant component of the error.
12
 
In other words, if UNION is only correlated with  , the estimates presented in Table 4a are in-
deed giving the size of the causal union impact on injuries. 
However, what if UNION is correlated with the time-variant component of the error? A 
stricter approach that controls for this type of union endogeneity is based on instrumental variable 
techniques. The challenge here is in finding an instrument for UNION that can also be used with 
the NLSY79 data set. One possibility is to use fringe benefits as Hildreth (2000), who instruments 
unionization with employer pension scheme provision. His rationale is that if unions are successful 
in obtaining fringe benefits for their members, then workers are more likely to join a union (see pp. 
139-40). And indeed, there is some empirical evidence suggesting that unionized workers receive 
better fringe benefits than their nonunionized counterparts (Freeman and Medoff 1984, ch. 4). The 
problem with this instrument in my context is, however, that workplaces that can afford fringe 
benefits might also provide more safety. Moreover, it might also be argued that fringe benefits are 
                                                 
12
See Cameron and Trivedi (2005) for more details on this and on the estimation techniques used in this paper. 
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a consequence and not a cause of unionization. 
Another instrument proposed in the literature is to use a lagged unionization variable as an 
instrument for current union status (see Chowdhury and Nickell 1985, Vella and Verbeek 1998, 
and Fernández-Val and Vella 2011). Estimating the impact of unions on wages (not on injuries), 
Vella and Verbeek (1998: 167) argue that lagged union status influences current status without 
having a direct impact on wages. Their argument is however less convincing if one considers the 
long-term impact of unions. For example, in my context of unions and safety, the instrument might 
be invalid if unions install durable safety equipment. 
Despite the concerns with these instruments, in this section, I report the UNION coefficient 
estimates using fringe benefits and lagged UNION as instruments. Fortunately, the NLSY79 has 
detailed information on fringe benefits and it also allows to construct a lagged UNION variable. 
The fringe benefits that I use are dummies respectively equal to one if the employer made available 
a retirement plan (RETIREMENT), maternity/paternity leave (MATERNITY), or dental insurance 
(DENTALINS). Summary statistics of these variables are provided in Table 3. 
Table 6 reports the estimates of the UNION coefficient using panel instrumental variables 
(IV) methods and adjusting for the full set of controls. Columns 1 to 3 show the fixed-effects IV 
estimates, each respectively using one of the instruments RETIREMENT, MATERNITY, or 
DENTALINS, while the estimates in column 4 use all these three instruments and are by 
fixed-effects two-stage least squares (2SLS). Column 5 reports the estimates by the so-called 
difference Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) using lagged levels of UNION as instru-
ments. Finally, the estimates in column 6 are by the so-called system GMM and use lagged levels 
and lagged differences of UNION as instruments. The first-stage regressions for columns 1 to 4 are 
reported in the appendix (see Table 10). 
 
{{Place Table 6 about here}} 
 
In terms of the sign of the impact and its significance, Table 6 seems to give a very clear 
picture. Irrespective of the instrument or estimation technique used, all estimates are positive and 
significant. Moreover, the first-stage F-statistic clearly suggests that none of the instruments are 
weak, and the Hansen test for overidentified restrictions after 2SLS and GMM supports the va-
lidity of the instruments. 
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Now, even if Table 6 appears to give a very clear picture, there are two problems regarding 
these results that should be mentioned: 
First, even if the Hansen test suggests that they are exogenous, the instruments that I am 
using might indeed be correlated with the error term in equation (1) and it might be difficult to 
justify their inclusion as explanatory variables in a structural model determining UNION. In fact, it 
might be much more realistic to assume that fringe benefits are a consequence of being unionized 
and not the opposite. 
Second, as Table 6 shows, instrument selection has an important effect on the union coef-
ficient values. The union coefficients range from .0214 to .2602. Although these results are not 
entirely satisfactory, they are not unusual in the empirical literature studying unions’ effects on 
different outcome variables (such as wages, job quit intentions, and job satisfaction). In fact, 
several authors have documented before that estimates of unions’ effects that account for union 
endogeneity fluctuate enormously and are in many cases very different to those that do not account 
for union endogeneity (Borjas 1979 (table 3); Freeman and Medoff 1982 (pp. 35-7); Lewis 1986; 
and Robinson 1989). 
In conclusion, my estimates provide suggestive, but not definitive, evidence that unions are 
causing more nonfatal injuries. A definitive test of this explanation will require better instruments 
than those available in the NLSY79 data set. 
 
Wages for safety 
 
Wages for safety (WFS) is the third most important explanation in Table 1. Unfortunately, 
the literature has not been very specific about the theoretical model underlying this explanation. 
The most likely interpretation is that, given the same firm’s production possibility frontier between 
wages and safety, unionized workers would choose higher wages in exchange for less safety. 
Lower safety levels might then lead to an increase in the number of injuries. 
In addition to Duncan and Stafford (1980), several authors have suggested that unions have 
indeed put too much emphasis on wages at the expense of better safety measures. Bacow (1980: 
101), for example, affirms that “[h]ealth and safety issues do not command a high position on 
union bargaining agendas because there is little political return on cleaning up the workplace; 
changes are often not recognized for years and the individuals most likely to benefit tend to be 
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underrepresented.” Nelking and Brown (1984: 117) affirm that “[w]orkers are often frustrated by 
the limited union influence over hazardous conditions. Preoccupied with bread and butter issues, 
some local officers regard health hazards as secondary.” Moreover, Fishback (1986: 290) argues 
that “the [United Mine Workers of America] may have devoted more of their efforts to improving 
wages and organizing nonunion districts than to improving safety.” 
If unions have indeed put more emphasis on wages at the expense of safety, then one way 
to test this explanation empirically is by adding a wage variable to regression (1). If the inclusion 
of the wage variable reduces the union coefficient, then this would constitute support for the 
wages-for-safety explanation. 
Table 7 reports the fixed effects estimates of (1) after adjusting for the full set of control 
variables. For convenience, column (1) simply replicates the estimates from Table 4a, column (4), 
that do not include the WAGE regressor. Column (2) reports the same estimates but restricting the 
sample to the observations for which the WAGE variable is available (but still without including 
the WAGE variable). The UNION estimates of the restricted and unrestricted samples in columns 
(1) and (2) are almost identical. Finally, column (3) shows the results if the WAGE variable is 
included. The results in columns (2) and (3) are comparable since they include the same observa-
tions. The definition and summary statistics of the WAGE variable are given in Table 3. 
 
{{Place Table 7 about here}} 
 
Comparing the estimates in columns (2) and (3) from Table 7 shows that the inclusion of 
the WAGE variable has slightly reduced the union coefficient. However, the UNION estimates in 
columns (2) and (3) are not statistically different from one another. Indeed, the UNION estimates 
in column (3) are within the 95% percent confidence interval of the estimates in column (2). In 
conclusion, the results in Table 7 do not provide support for the wages-for-safety explanation.
13
 
 
New explanations 
 
The results from the previous section suggest that none of the traditional explanations is 
                                                 
13
One problem with these estimates is that the WAGE variable might be endogenous. It is however difficult to find a 
convincing instrument that is correlated with wages but uncorrelated with injuries. 
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enough to explain the positive injury gap between unionized and nonunionized workers. This 
section introduces two new explanations to the literature on unions and occupational injuries. The 
new explanations are respectively called “moral hazard” and “distribution shifting.” 
 
Moral hazard and related explanations 
 
There is one body of literature, not connected to labor unions, that argues that moral hazard 
from the workers’ side might mitigate the impact of better safety measures in reducing the injury 
probability. The argument is that workers themselves might (partially) offset the benefits of a safer 
work environment by diminishing their own safety-enhancing efforts (Viscusi 1979b; Rea 1981; 
Carmichael 1986; and Lanoie 1991). These authors however ignore the role of labor unions and 
suggest that it is the firms or the government that provide the safer work environment. Supported 
by the anecdotal evidence briefly summarized in the introduction, I extend this argument by 
stressing that it is labor unions that are at the origin of many occupational health and safety 
measures (Donado and Wälde 2012). However, the increased safety and protection that unions 
provide might enhance workers’ feeling of safety, leading workers to adapt their behavior, for 
example, by working faster, becoming bolder, or by taking less safety precautions. This riskier 
behavior might (partially) offset unions’ safety efforts. 
This explanation is similar to Peltzman’s (1975) argument on why the introduction of auto 
safety measures (like seat belts or dual braking system) did not reduce highway death rates as 
intended. His explanation is that safety measures make drivers feel safer, and drivers adapt their 
behavior by driving faster or more carelessly than they would do without the safety measures. This 
change in behavior diminishes and maybe even offsets any positive effects of regulation. Several 
studies have found support for Peltzman’s explanation (see OECD 1990). 
In order to make the argument clearer in the context of occupational health and safety, 
consider the following simple model. Suppose that p, the worker’s injury probability, depends on 
s, the safety measures provided by the firm, and on e, the worker’s own precautionary efforts. In 
the theoretical literature, s is always set by the firm or regulated by the government. However, 
since unions are often at the origin of many safety measures, we can instead let s be the outcome of 
a bargained agreement between the firm and the labor union or be a safety standard imposed by 
regulation due to unions’ influence (see Donado and Wälde 2012). Also suppose that e depends on 
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s since it is usually firms that first choose the level of safety measures and then workers that react 
by choosing how much precautionary effort to provide. The worker’s injury probability is thus 
given by   sespp ,  and an increase in the firm’s safety measures has the following impact on 
this injury probability 
 
 .
s
e
e
p
s
p
ds
dp







  (2) 
 
It is usually assumed that sp  /  and ep  /  are negative (that is, more firm’s safety or 
more worker’s effort reduce the injury probability), but the impact of more safety on workers’ 
effort, ,/ se   can be positive, negative, or equal to zero. In general, it can be shown that the sign 
of se  /  depends, at least in part, on whether e and s are substitutes, complements, or inde-
pendent (e.g. Rea 1981, pp. 83-4). If se  /  is nonnegative (e and s are complements or inde-
pendent), then an improvement in safety measures clearly reduces the injury probability in (2), that 
is, .0/ dsdp  However, if se  /  is negative (e and s are substitutes), we speak of “moral haz-
ard” and the sign of dsdp /  depends on which of the two terms on the right-hand side of (2) 
dominates. It is difficult to think of a model specification in which the moral hazard effect is so 
strong that the second term dominates, leading to an overall increase in the injury probability. We 
might therefore expect that moral hazard might only be able to mitigate but not to offset (or more 
than offset) the impact of firm’s safety measures on the workers injury probability. 
However, if the moral hazard explanation is complemented with other arguments, then it 
might be possible to obtain an increase of the injury probability after an improvement in s. For 
example, some authors have shown theoretically that moral hazard can indeed lead to a higher 
injury probability in the presence of imperfect information concerning occupational risks (Rea 
1981), or if the expected penalty for firms for noncompliance with governmental safety standards 
is extremely high (Viscusi 1979b: 121), or if the safety standards only provide incentives to change 
s while leaving the incentives to change e unaffected (Lanoie 1991: 94). 
My estimates so far already provide some support for the moral hazard explanation. The 
reason is that I estimated most of my regressions by fixed effects. The fixed-effects estimator only 
relies on the so-called within variation, that is, the variation over time of a given individual (see fn. 
21 
 
11). My estimates are consistent with moral hazard since they imply that the injury probability of 
the same worker increases when the worker changes status from nonunion to union 
In fact, when only cross-sectional data is available, it is only possible to estimate the union 
impact on injuries by comparing the group of unionized with the group of nonunionized workers in 
one single period of time. However, in order to find evidence of moral hazard, we still need to 
establish if the same worker is having more injuries after joining a union. The question is if there is 
an increase in the injury probability of a worker that in period one was not unionized and in period 
two joins a union. Has joining a union made any difference for this worker in terms of injury 
probability? This type of analysis can only be performed with panel data at the individual level, 
like the NLSY79, since only this type of data has information on the same person for two or more 
periods. None of the previous studies from the literature was able to perform such an analysis 
because of data limitations. 
Now, one concern about my panel-data UNION estimates is that they might be contami-
nated by unobserved job characteristics that are correlated with union status, in particular, if these 
characteristics change when the worker changes his union status. One way to account for this 
possibility is to estimate the UNION coefficient after dropping all observations if a worker changes 
employer. The logic of this approach is that changes in the unobserved job characteristics should 
be smaller for job changers that stay with the same employer than for job changers that also change 
their employer. 
The NLSY79 collects information on how many years a person has been working for the 
same employer and the point in time in which the person switches to a new employer. By re-
stricting the sample, the UNION coefficient is identified using variation from union status changes 
for workers that remain with the same employer. 
Table 8 shows the UNION estimates for two different ways of dropping the observations. 
In the first row, the regressions only use observations if the previous employer is the same as the 
current employer and drops all other observations.
14
 For the estimates in the second row, the 
observations were dropped differently. The estimates exclude all observations if the respondent 
                                                 
14
 Restricting the sample to workers that do not change employer yields 54,259 observations, of which 9,749 are union 
members. The number of workers that change union status without changing employer is 2,225, which consists of 980 
union joiners and 1,245 union leavers. Also note, as argued by Freeman (1984), that measurement error (misclassi-
fication of workers that join or leave a union) might bias panel estimates of union effects. In the context of this paper, 
measurement error in the changes of individuals joining or leaving a union might play a more important role for the 
subsample of workers that do not change their employer. 
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has been working for the same employer for less than 100 weeks (which roughly corresponds to 
two years). In other words, the estimates are for respondents that have been working for the same 
employer for two years or more. All estimates reported in the table are for the whole sample and 
the male, female, blue collar, and white collar subsamples. The numbers in parenthesis and in 
square brackets are respectively the panel robust standard errors and the number of observations. 
 
{{Place Table 8 about here}} 
 
As the table shows, the UNION coefficients for the whole sample are positive but signif-
icant only at the 10% level. However, while the coefficients are insignificant for females, they are 
still positive at the conventional 5% level for males. The female results can be compared to those 
of Table 4b, column 4, in which the significance of the female coefficients was already not very 
high. This suggests that unionization does not make much of a difference in terms of nonfatal 
injuries for females. Contrary to this, the results for the males subsample appear to indicate that, 
even when they stay with the same employer, male workers are more likely to have a nonfatal 
injury when they become unionized. 
Now, it might also be possible that, within the same employer, some workers are moving 
from riskier production jobs to less risky management jobs when changing their status from union 
to nonunion. To explore this possibility, columns 4 and 5, re-estimate the model only for blue 
collars or white collars, respectively. The coefficients are now insignificant, maybe in part due to a 
reduction in the precision of the estimates because of the smaller sample size. They do however 
suggest that movement out of production jobs is a potential explanation for the injury gap. Also 
note that restricting the sample to male blue collars (results not reported) also gives insignificant 
coefficients. 
To conclude this section, the evidence that I present here is not definitive but is consistent 
with the moral hazard explanation. However, this evidence is also consistent with other potential 
explanations. For instance, it looks as if moving from riskier production jobs to less risky man-
agement jobs might also be a valid explanation for the gap. 
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Distribution shifting 
 
The bottom panel of Table 2 suggests that unions reduce fatalities but increase the likeli-
hood of nonfatal injuries. From all the explanations that I have studied so far, only the “reporting” 
explanation seems to be consistent with this pattern. In fact, since fatal injuries are more difficult to 
hide, underreporting of this type of injuries is not usually a major problem in nonunionized 
workplaces. This means that when a workplace becomes unionized and unions reduce the number 
of fatal injuries (as one would expect), then the reducing impact of unions can be clearly seen in 
the data. As mentioned before, this is not always the case for nonfatal injuries since unions are 
expected to reduce the number of actual injuries but also to increase the number of reported inju-
ries. 
Being consistent with the pattern from Table 2 is clearly an advantage of the “reporting” 
explanation. Since all previous data sets employed in the literature are based on reported injuries, 
the reporting explanation might partially account for this pattern when employing those data sets. 
The only problem, however, is that the results that I presented in the “reporting” section do not 
seem to support this explanation since they suggest that unions are associated with more actual 
nonfatal injuries. It seems that there is more needed than the reporting explanation to be able to 
account for the pattern from Table 2. 
Another explanation that I call “distribution shifting” looks at the impact that a reduction in 
fatalities might have on nonfatal injuries. Could it, for example, be possible that unions increase 
the likelihood of nonfatal injuries by reducing the likelihood of fatalities? In other words, might it 
be possible that better union-sponsored safety measures turn workplace accidents that would 
otherwise result in a fatality into “only” a severe nonfatal injury? Are unions converting fatalities 
into nonfatal injuries? 
Although the NLSY79 data set is not appropriate for testing this explanation, two pieces of 
evidence can however be helpful in assessing its validity: 
First, an estimation of the union impact on total injuries (fatal + nonfatal) should result in 
an insignificant UNION coefficient. This is only true if unions are effective in turning fatalities 
into nonfatal injuries by leaving the number of “no injuries” unaffected. The only two studies from 
the literature that have estimated the impact of unions on total injuries (and only for the coal 
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mining industry) seem to be Boden (1977) and Appleton and Baker (1984). In both studies, the 
estimated union coefficient is positive and highly significant. As such, these results do not rule out 
this explanation. Instead, they suggest that this explanation alone is not able to account for the 
pattern in Table 2. 
Second, a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that this explanation does not seem to 
fit the official data. In fact, based on published figures from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, there 
has been an average of around one workplace fatality for every 850 nonfatal injuries in the USA 
for the period 1994 to 2010.
15
 If unions were able to reduce fatal injuries by Boal’s (2009) esti-
mate of 40%,
16
 that is, if unions were able to turn 40% of the fatalities into nonfatal injuries, the 
percentage increase in nonfatal injuries would be less than 0.07%. My own estimates, however, 
point to a much higher union increase of 34% in the nonfatal injury probability. In other words, 
even if Boal’s 40% estimate was very conservative, the number of fatalities to nonfatal injuries is 
simply too low for a reduction in fatalities to have any drastic impact on nonfatal injuries. 
In conclusion, it seems that “distribution shifting” can only explain a very small fraction of 
the injury gap. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper begins by presenting a literature summary based on 25 empirical studies in-
vestigating the impact of labor unions on occupational injuries. The summary shows that most 
studies associate unions with more nonfatal injuries but with fewer fatalities. In particular, that 
unions are associated with more nonfatal injuries is puzzling since this result clearly contradicts 
expectations based on anecdotal evidence and on unions’ safety-enhancing activities. 
Using individual-level panel data for the first time, I re-estimate the impact of unions on 
nonfatal injuries and investigate if each of 5 potential explanations can account for this puzzling 
result. The explanations that I study comprise the three traditional explanations from the literature 
(reporting, selection, and wages for safety) plus two new explanations that I label “moral hazard” 
and “distribution shifting.” My panel results show that controlling for time-invariant individual 
                                                 
15
In 2001, for example, there were an estimated of 5,915 occupational fatalities and 5,215,600 nonfatal injuries in the 
USA, implying a nonfatal-to-fatal ratio of 882 for this year (see http://www.bls.gov/iif/). 
16
This is the estimated impact of unions on fatalities from Boal (2009), although for the coal mining industry and for 
the period 1897-1929. 
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characteristics reduces the nonfatal “injury gap” between union and nonunion workers by around 
40%. Moreover, it seems that, except for “wages for safety,” all other 4 explanations might each of 
them account for a fraction of the remaining injury gap. Overall, it appears that a combination of 
two or more explanations might even reduce the gap to zero, but it does not seem that the gap could 
ever become negative. I, therefore, conclude that the impact of unions in reducing nonfatal injuries 
might be at best insignificant. 
 
 
Appendix 
 
Definitions and summary statistics of the dummy variables 
 
{{Place Table 9 about here}} 
 
First-stage regressions 
 
{{Place Table 10 about here}} 
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Table 1. Studies investigating the impact of labor unions on occupational injuries 
Study Country Industry Years Data Cross-sect. unit Obs. Union 
variable 
Injury variable 
(impact) 
Explanation given if impact positive 
and/or insignificant 
Chelius (1974) USA MA 67 CS Establishments 2627 COV NFI (ps)  
Boden (1977) USA CM 73-75 PA Coal mines 6468(?) MEM NFI (pi, ps) 
FAT (ni) 
NFI: 1) REP, 2) Labor-management strife, 
3) WFS 
Viscusi (1979a), 
app. F.2 
USA SE 69-70 CS Blue collars 496 MEM NFI (ps) SEL 
Leigh (1982)* USA SE 77 CS Blue collars 369 MEM NFI (ps)  
Worrall and Butler 
(1983)* 
USA SE 78 CS Blue collars 2428- 
2608 
MEM NFI (pi, ps) REP 
Appleton and Baker 
(1984, 1985)* 
USA CM 79 CS Coal mines 213 MEM NFI (ps, ps, ps, 
pi) 
1) Union’s job bidding system, 2) Low 
productivity, 3) Labor characteristics, 4) 
Other institutional factors 
Boden (1985) USA CM 73-75 PA Coal mines 5776 MEM NFI (ps) 
FAT (ni) 
NFI: REP 
Fishback (1986) USA CM 12-23 PA US states 198 MEM FAT (ni, ni, pi) 1) WFS, 2) Public good aspects of safety 
may not have been important enough 
Fishback (1987) USA CM 09-23 PA US states 264 MEM FAT (ni)  
Wallace (1987) USA CM 30-82 TS CM industry 53 MEM NFI (ns) 
FAT (ns) 
 
Garen (1988) USA SE 81-82 CS Blue collars 2863 MEM NFI (ni) 
FAT (ns) 
 
Fairris (1992)* USA PNS 69-70 CS Blue collars 381 COV NFI (pi) 1) SEL, 2) Union’s job bidding system, 3) 
WFS 
Lanoie (1992) Canada SE 82-87 PA Industries 140 MEM NFI (ps) REP 
Nichols et al. (1995) UK MA 90 CS Establishments 494 COV NFI (ps) SEL 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 1. (continued) 
Study Country Industry Years Data Cross-sect. unit Obs. Union 
variable 
Injury variable 
(impact) 
Explanation given if impact positive 
and/or insignificant 
Reilly et al. (1995)* UK MA 90 CS Establishments 432 MEM NFI (pi) Variable used captures inadequately impact 
of unions on occupational health and safety 
Reardon (1996)* USA CM 86-88 PA Coal mines 10808 MEM NFI+FAT (ni) 1) Union reduces probability of severe NFI 
by increasing reporting of less severe NFI, 
2) Nonunion firms, in an attempt to remain 
nonunion, improve health and safety, 3) 
Union’s safety committees and inspectors 
are not efficacious, 4) SEL 
Hillage et al. (2000), 
app. C 
UK SE 98 CS Establishments 1982 MEM NFI (ps)  
Eaton and Nocerino 
(2000) 
USA PS 88-89 CS, PA Workplaces 213 UR NFI (pi, ni) REP 
Litwin (2000)* UK SE 98 CS Workplaces 1640 MEM NFI (ps) 1) WFS, 2) REP, 3) SEL 
Thomason and 
Pozzebon (2002) 
Canada SE 95 CS Firms 424 MEM NFI (ps) REP (?): Union workers file more com-
pensation claims 
Fenn and Ashby 
(2004)* 
UK SE 98 CS Establishments 1636- 
1749 
MEM NFI (ps, pi, pi, 
ni) 
1) REP, 2) More generous sick pay ar-
rangements in union workplaces 
Gray and Mendeloff 
(2005) 
USA MA 92-98 PA Establishments 50276 MEM NFI (ni)  
Robinson and 
Smallman (2006) 
UK MA, SV 98 CS Establishments 1585- 
1597 
MEM NFI (ps, ps) REP 
Nichols et al. 
(2007)* 
UK MA 90 CS Establishments 426 MEM NFI (pi) 1) REP, 2) SEL 
Boal (2008, 2009)* USA CM 02-29 PA US states 210 MEM FAT (ns) REP 
 USA CM 1897- 
1928 
PA Coal mines 5779- 
7486 
COV NFI (pi) 
FAT (ns) 
NFI: REP 
Notes: * denotes that study focuses primarily on impact of unions on injuries. SHORTCUTS: Industry: coal mining (CM), manufacturing (MA), private nonagricultural sector (PNS), public sector 
(PS), several (SE), service (SV). Data: cross-sectional (CS), panel (PA), times series (TS). Union and injury variables: coverage (COV), membership (MEM), union resources (UR), nonfatal 
injury (NFI), fatal injury (FAT). Impact of unions on injuries: positive (p), negative (n), significant at the 5% level (s), and insignificant (i). Explanation impact: reporting (REP), selection 
(SEL), wages for safety (WFS). 
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Table 2. Key proportions and number of estimates by injury type of the 43   estimates 
 Key proportions 
Country  Industry  Data 
                  USA  70%    Coal mining  44%    Cross-sectional 58% 
UK  26%    Manufacturing  12%     Panel 37% 
Canada  5%    Other  44%    Time series 5% 
                
Aggregation  Union variable  Injury variable 
                 Individual  16%     Membership 84%    Nonfatal injuries 74% 
Establishment 65%    Coverage 12%    Fatalities 26 % 
Industry 7%  Other 4%    
US states 12%             
   
   
   Number of estimates 
 
Injury type 
 Negative 
significant 
 Negative 
insignificant 
 Positive 
insignificant 
 Positive 
significant 
         All injuries  5  10  12  16 
Fatal  4  6  1  0 
Nonfatal  1  4  11  16 
               
Notes: “Individual” includes blue collars, household heads, and workers. “Establishment” also includes coal mines, workplaces, 
and firms. In this table, “significant” means significant at the conventional 5% level. 
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Table 3. Definitions and sample means 
Variable Definition 
Sample means Difference 
nonmembers / 
members 
All 
Nonunion 
member 
Union 
member 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
NFI 1 if any work-related injury or illness 0.062 0.055 0.105 -0.050*** 
COVERAGE 1 if covered by union contract 0.187 0.051 1 -0.949*** 
MEMBERSHIP 1 if in union or employee association 0.142 0 1 -- 
HEALTH 1 if health limits kind of work 0.040 0.040 0.037 0.003 
SATISF Global job satisfaction on a scale of 1 to 4 
(highest) 
3.311 3.315 3.294 0.021** 
TENURE Total tenure in weeks with employer 212.8 196.8 308.9 -112.1*** 
TENURESQ Square of tenure 95011 84408 158711 -74303*** 
FIRMSIZE Log of number of employees at location of 
respondent’s job 
4.069 3.904 5.061 -1.156*** 
HOURSWEEK Hours per week worked 40.32 40.26 40.72 -0.461*** 
EDUCATION Highest grade completed 13.07 13.06 13.14 -0.079*** 
CHILDREN Number of biological, adopted, or 
step-children in household 
1.356 1.343 1.438 -0.096*** 
AGE Age in years 31.98 31.87 32.65 -0.781*** 
MARRIED 1 if married 0.541 0.538 0.563 -0.026*** 
URBAN 1 if residence located in urban area 0.783 0.776 0.828 -0.052*** 
MALE 1 if male 0.516 0.504 0.590 -0.086*** 
BLACK 1 if black 0.280 0.270 0.340 -0.069*** 
HISPANIC 1 if Hispanic 0.180 0.178 0.192 -0.014*** 
SEVERITY Number of work days missed due to NFI 23.81 21.44 31.23 -9.795*** 
DANGEROUS88 Job is dangerous on a scale of 1 to 4 (worst) 1.943 1.886 2.357 -0.471*** 
UNHEALTHY88 Unhealthy working conditions on a scale of 1 
to 4 (worst) 
1.793 1.734 2.224 -0.490*** 
INDUSTRYRISK Log of injury and illness cases per 10000 
full-time workers by industry 
6.544 6.518 6.712 -0.194*** 
RETIREMENT 1 if employer made available retirement plan 
other than social security 
0.612 0.566 0.871 -0.305*** 
MATERNITY 1 if employer made available materni-
ty/paternity leave 
0.642 0.614 0.799 -0.186*** 
DENTALINS 1 if employer made available dental insurance 0.591 0.549 0.829 -0.280*** 
WAGE Log of hourly rate of pay 6.861 6.816 7.125 -0.309*** 
Notes: The statistics are for the years 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 96, 98, and 2000, except for DANGEROUS88 and UNHEALTHY88 that are only for the 
year 88. The complete definitions of the union status variables are: COVERAGE: “1 if wages set by collective bargaining, or if covered by union or 
employee contract, or if MEMBERSHIP=1”. MEMBERSHIP: “1 if in union or employee association, 0 otherwise. Before 1994 also =0 if COV-
ERAGE=0”. In order to attenuate problems with measurement errors, I set SEVERITY as missing if NFI was missing or if NFI=0. Only variables for 
what the NLSY79 calls the “CPS job” or “job # 1” were used. *Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level. 
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Table 4a. Pooled OLS and fixed-effects estimates of the injury-union regression 
  Pooled OLS  Fixed Effects 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
COVERAGE  .0271    .0160   
  (.0037)***    (.0043)***   
MEMBERSHIP    .0326    .0201 
    (.0044)***    (.0054)*** 
HEALTH  .1221  .1214  .0999  .0992 
  (.0087)***  (.0086)***  (.0104)***  (.0103)*** 
SATISF  -.0105  -.0103  -.0098  -.0097 
  (.0017)***  (.0017)***  (.0020)***  (.0020)*** 
TENURE  .0001  .0001  .0002  .0002 
  (.0000)***  (.0000)***  (.0000)***  (.0000)*** 
TENURESQ  -10.4e-08  -10.2e-08  -13.2e-08  -13.2e-08 
  (17.4e-09)***  (17.4e-09)***  (19.1e-09)***  (19.1e-09)*** 
FIRMSIZE  .0021  .0021  .0020  .0021 
  (.0005)***  (.0005)***  (.0007)***  (.0007)*** 
HOURSWEEK  .0010  .0010  .0007  .0007 
  (.0001)***  (.0001)***  (.0001)***  (.0001)*** 
EDUCATION  -.0029  -.0029  .0004  .0004 
  (.0006)***  (.0006)***  (.0027)  (.0027) 
CHILDREN  .0028  .0029  .0038  .0039 
  (.0011)**  (.0011)***  (.0025)  (.0025) 
AGE  .0002  .0002  .0032  .0035 
  (.0005)  (.0005)  (.0041)  (.0040) 
MARRIED  -.0041  -.0041  .0012  .0013 
  (.0025)*  (.0025)*  (.0035)  (.0035) 
URBAN  -.0024  -.0026  -.0062  -.0063 
  (.0030)  (.0030)  (.0044)  (.0044) 
MALE  .0049  .0050  --  -- 
  (.0028)*  (.0028)*     
BLACK  -.0212  -.0205  --  -- 
  (.0031)***  (.0031)***     
HISPANIC  -.0109  -.0106  --  -- 
  (.0035)***  (.0035)***     
         
Nonunion baseline  .0563  .0567  .0584  .0585 
Injury gap  48%  57%  27%  34% 
Observations  56855  56851  56855  56851 
Notes: The table reports estimates of equation (1). The outcome variable is always NFI (see Table 3 for definition). All estimates are based 
on linear probability models and also include dummies for 8 years, 3 regions, 11 industries, and 11 occupations. The estimates in columns 
1 and 2 are OLS and in columns 3 and 4 are fixed effects. All standard errors in parenthesis are panel robust (clustered at the individual 
level). The “nonunion baseline” is computed as the average predicted probability of the outcome variable using the estimated coefficients 
on the control variables. The “injury gap” is the percentage increase in the injury probability of nonunion member to union member. 
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level. 
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Table 4b. Estimates of the injury-union regression for different subsamples 
  Males  Females  Blue collars  White collars 
  OLS FE  OLS FE  OLS FE  OLS FE 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
             
COVERAGE  .0306 .0237  .0198 .0062  .0284 .0249  .0225 .0108 
  (.0053)*** (.0061)***  (.0049)*** (.0060)  (.0068)*** (.0089)***  (.0040)*** (.0048)** 
  [29707] [29707]  [27148] [27148]  [17840] [17840]  [39015] [39015] 
             
MEMBERSHIP  .0340 .0252  .0275 .0135  .0298 .0179  .0299 .0205 
  (.0062)*** (.0074)***  (.0061)*** (.0078)*  (.0077)*** (.0104)*  (.0050)*** (.0062)*** 
  [29702] [29702]  [27149] [27149]  [17830] [17830]  [39021] [39021] 
             
Notes: The table reports estimates of the UNION coefficient in equation (1) for the subsamples “males”, “females”, “blue collars”, and “white 
collars.” The outcome variable is always NFI (see Table 3 for definition). All estimates are based on linear probability models and include the full 
set of control variables. The estimates in columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 are by OLS and in columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 are by fixed effects. All standard errors in 
parenthesis are panel robust (clustered at the individual level). The number of observations is reported in square brackets. *Statistically significant 
at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level. 
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Table 5. Estimates of the injury-union regression controlling for workplace risk 
  Benchmark88  DANGEROUS88  UNHEALTHY88  INDUSTRYRISK_1  INDUSTRYRISK_2  INDUSTRYRISK_3 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
              
UNION  .0405  .0280  .0287  .0199  .0199  .0210 
  (.0126)***  (.0124)**  (.0125)**  (.0062)***  (.0066)***  (.0066)*** 
Workplace 
risk 
   .0411  .0334  .0051  .0051  .0079 
   (.0040)***  (.0041)***  (.0031)*  (.0032)  (.0026)*** 
             
Controls?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Person fixed 
effects? 
 No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry 
dummies? 
 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Observations  7251  7209  7207  49392  48397  48397 
Notes: The table reports estimates of the UNION coefficient in equation (1) only for the union status measure MEMBERSHIP. The outcome 
variable is always NFI. All estimates are based on linear probability models. The estimates in columns 1 to 3 are by OLS and are only for the 
year 1988. All estimates include the full set of control variables and one of the working condition variables (DANGEROUS88, UN-
HEALTHY88 or INDUSTRYRISK). The estimates in columns 1 to 3 also include MALE, BLACK and HISPANIC (see Table 3 for definitions). 
The estimates in column 4 to 6 are by fixed effects and also include 8 year dummies. The estimates in column 6 do not include industry 
dummies. Standard errors in parenthesis in columns 1 to 3 are robust, in column 4 are panel robust (clustered at the individual level), and in 
columns 5 and 6 are panel robust (clustered at the individual and at the industry level). *Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 
level; ***at the .01 level. 
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Table 6. Estimates of the injury-union regression controlling for union endogeneity  
  IV1  IV2  IV3  2SLS  diff GMM  sys GMM 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
              
UNION  .2094  .2602  .1549  .1882  .0289  .0214 
  (.0524)***  (.0868)***  (.0572)***  (.0438)***  (.0159)*  (.0091)** 
             
Controls?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Person fixed 
effects? 
 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  52081  49238  52850  48332  27065  42908 
             
Instrument(s)  RETIREMENT  MATERNITY  DENTALINS  
RETIREMENT 
MATERNITY 
DENTALINS 
 
Lagged 
levels 
UNION 
 
Lagged 
levels and 
differences 
UNION 
             
F-statistic  235.96  128.47  198.80  105.97     
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000     
             
Hansen        3.098  14.42  16.94 
p-value         0.212  0.809  0.911 
Notes: The table reports estimates of the UNION coefficient in equation (1) controlling for union endogeneity and only for the union status 
measure MEMBERSHIP. The outcome variable is always NFI. All estimates are based on linear probability models and include the full set 
of control variables. The estimates in columns 1 to 4 also include 8 year dummies. The GMM estimates in columns 5 and 6 exclude 
observations for uneven years. For the first differences, on which GMM estimates are based, I assumed that even years were consecutive, 
and only 6 year dummies were included as additional controls. Standard errors in parenthesis are panel robust (clustered at the individual 
level). The table also reports the first-stage F-statistic for weak instruments and the Hansen’s instrument validity test. *Statistically 
significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level. 
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Table 7. Wages-for-safety estimates 
  Unrestricted sample  Restricted sample  
Restricted sample 
with wages 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
       
UNION  .0201  .0202  .0194 
  (.0054)***  (.0055)***  (.0055)*** 
WAGE      .0066 
      (.0025)*** 
       
Controls?  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Person fixed effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  56851  55472  55472 
Notes: The table reports the coefficient estimates of equation (1). Column (1) replicates the results from Table 4a, column (4). Column 
(2) reports similar estimates that restrict the sample to the observations for which the WAGE variable is available. Finally, column (3) 
reports the estimates that include the WAGE variable. In all three columns, the union variable is MEMBERSHIP and the outcome 
variable is NFI. The estimates are based on a fixed-effects linear probability model that includes the full set of control variables plus 8 
year dummies. Standard errors in parenthesis are panel robust (clustered at the individual level). *Statistically significant at the .10 
level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level. 
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Table 8. Estimates for different subsamples 
  All  Males  Females  
Blue 
collars 
 
White 
collars 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           
Excluding obs. if 
employer 
changes 
 .0131  .0245  -.0023  .0125  .0125 
 (.0079)*  (.0115)**  (.0105)  (.0174)  (.0085) 
 [36699]  [19179]  [17520]  [10966]  [25733] 
           
Excluding obs. if 
tenure < 100 
weeks 
 .0135  .0242  .0003  .0244  .0082 
 (.0080)*  (.0118)**  (.0103)  (.0180)  (.0084) 
 [33774]  [17813]  [15961]  [10099]  [23675] 
           
Notes: The table reports estimates of the UNION coefficient in equation (1) for different subsamples. All estimates are by fixed 
effects. The union variable is always MEMBERSHIP and the outcome variable is always NFI (see Table 3 for definitions). The first 
row of estimates only uses observations if the previous employer is the same as the current employer and drops all other observa-
tions. In the second row, the estimates exclude observations if the respondent has been working for the same employer for less than 
100 weeks. All estimates are based on linear probability models and include the full set of control variables. All standard errors in 
parenthesis are panel robust (clustered at the individual level). The number of observations is reported in square brackets. 
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level. 
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Table 9. Definitions and summary statistics of the region, industry, and occupation dummies 
Variable  Definition  Mean Std. Dev. 
SOUTH  1 if region of residence South  0.395 0.489 
NORTHEAST  1 if region of residence Northeast  0.171 0.376 
NORTHCENT  1 if region of residence North Central  0.234 0.423 
WEST  1 if region of residence West  0.200 0.400 
AGRICU  Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries  0.025 0.158 
MINING  Mining  0.006 0.076 
CONSTRUC  Construction  0.075 0.263 
MANUF  Manufacturing  0.181 0.385 
TRANSP  Transportation, communications, and other public utilities  0.068 0.252 
TRADE  Wholesale and retail trade  0.176 0.380 
FINANCE  Finance, insurance, and real estate  0.060 0.238 
BUSINESS  Business and repair services  0.080 0.271 
PERSONAL  Personal services  0.045 0.208 
ENTERTAIN  Entertainment and recreation services  0.014 0.118 
PROFSERV  Professional and related services  0.206 0.405 
PUBLIC  Public administration  0.060 0.238 
PROFTECH  Professional, technical and kindred workers  0.171 0.376 
MANAGER  Managers and administrators, except farm  0.124 0.330 
SALES  Sales workers  0.044 0.204 
CLERICAL  Clerical and unskilled workers  0.180 0.384 
CRAFT  Craftsmen and kindred workers  0.115 0.319 
OPERAT  Operatives, except transport  0.093 0.291 
TROPERAT Transport equipment operatives  0.041 0.198 
LABORERS  Laborers, except farm  0.063 0.243 
FARMER  Farmers and farm managers  0.003 0.057 
FARMLAB  Farm laborers and foreman  0.007 0.085 
SERVICE  Service workers, except private household  0.148 0.355 
PRIVATE  Private household workers  0.009 0.094 
BLUECOLLAR 1 if occupation CRAFT, OPERAT, TROPERAT, or LABORERS 0.313 0.464 
Notes: Statistics are for the years 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 96, 98, and 2000. The industry and occupation dummies are based on the classification system of the 1970 
Census of Population. 
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Table 10. First-stage regressions for Table 6. Dependent variable: MEMBERSHIP 
RETIREMENT  .0630      .0458 
  (.0041)***      (.0044)*** 
MATERNITY    .0381    .0141 
    (.0034)***    (.0035)*** 
DENTALINS      .0568  .0394 
      (.0040)***  (.0045)*** 
         
Controls?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Person fixed 
effects? 
 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  52081  49238  52850  48332 
         
F-statistic  235.96  128.47  198.80  105.97 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Notes: The table reports the instruments’ coefficients of the first-stage regressions for Table 6. The outcome variable is always 
MEMBERSHIP. All estimates include the full set of control variables plus 8 year dummies. Standard errors in parenthesis are 
panel robust (clustered at the individual level). The table also reports the first-stage F-statistic for weak instruments. *Statistically 
significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level. 
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Figure 1. Injury gaps for different injury severity degrees 
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